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An emerging challenge for process safety is process control system cybersecurity. An attacker could gain control
of the process actuators through the control system or communication policies within control loops and potentially
drive the process state to unsafe conditions. Cybersecurity has traditionally been handled as an information technology
(IT) problem in the process industries. In the literature for cybersecurity specifically of control systems, there has
been work aimed at developing control designs that seek to fight cyberattacks by either giving the system appropriate
response mechanisms once attacks are detected or seeking to make the attacks difficult to perform. In this work,
we begin an exploration into the implications of process and equipment design for enhancing the ability of chemical
processes to maintain safe operation during cyberattacks on the process control systems.
Keywords
Process control, process design, cybersecurity, process operational safety.
Introduction
Significant research work with regard to enhancing pro-
cess operational safety through control design has appeared
in recent years (e.g., Albalawi et al. [2018]). In these recent
works, safety issues can occur due to a variety of causes,
such as large disturbances Zhang et al. [2018]. Safety inci-
dents which can be caused by cyberattacks on control sys-
tems have also received focus recently Wu et al. [2018]. Cy-
bersecurity breaches of process control systems at chemical
processing facilities could create significant safety hazards
for plant workers and residents of communities around such
processing facilities. A traditional approach to preventing
cyberattacks from causing safety issues at chemical plants is
to augment IT defenses (by, for example, employing firewalls
and applying software patches) to reduce the ability of attack-
ers to impact process safety. However, IT defenses have lim-
itations and are not guaranteed to prevent cyberattacks from
being successful. Solutions which modify the communica-
tion/networking channels in control loops so that they are not
susceptible to cyberattacks could form a part of the solution;
however, the trend in the chemical process industries away
from more secure wired communication to wireless com-
munication indicates that cybersecurity solutions which are
cumbersome and prevent companies from taking advantage
of advances in computing are not the options of interest to
industry. Despite the high stakes involved in cyberattacks
(i.e., the potential for an attack to cause the deaths of many
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plant workers and community members), the direction to pur-
sue to make plants cyberattack-resilient within a framework
that is attractive to industry is not currently clear. Recent
advances with respect to preventing control system cyberat-
tacks from succeeding have focused on cyberattack detec-
tion Satchidanandan and Kumar [2017] and also control of
systems during attacks Zhu and Başar [2015].
In a recent work Durand [2018], we have defined
cyberattack-resilience of a control system in a nonlinear sys-
tems framework to mean that there exist no inputs which can
drive the closed-loop state out of the set of safe operating
conditions. Developing viable processes which meet this def-
inition, if it is possible, will require more than control system
advances. In the remainder of this work, we begin an anal-
ysis of the role of process and equipment design in realizing
operational safety in the face of cyberattacks.
Preliminaries
Notation
The notation | · | signifies the Euclidean norm of a vector.
xT signifies the transpose of a vector x. We define tk = k∆,
where ∆ refers to the sampling period and k = 0, 1, . . ..
diag(x) represents a matrix with the components of the vec-
tor x on its diagonal.
Class of Systems
We consider classes of process systems of the form:
ẋ = f(x, u, w) (1)
where x ∈ X ⊂ Rn represents the process state vector,
u ∈ U ⊂ Rm represents the process input vector, and
w ∈ W ⊂ Rz represents the vector of bounded process dis-
turbances (i.e., W := {w ∈ Rz| |w| ≤ θ, θ > 0}). f is a
nonlinear, locally Lipschitz vector function of its arguments.
We consider that f(0, 0, 0) = 0 and that X is the set of safe
states (i.e., if x ∈ X , ∀ t ≥ 0, no process incidents occur).
Model Predictive Control
Model predictive control (MPC) is an optimization-based
control design which solves the following optimization prob-





Le(x̃(τ), u(τ)) dτ (2a)
s.t. ˙̃x(t) = f(x̃(t), u(t), 0) (2b)
x̃(tk) = x(tk) (2c)
x̃(t) ∈ X, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N ) (2d)
u(t) ∈ U, ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+N ) (2e)
In Eq. (2), u(t) ∈ S(∆) signifies that the input trajectory
is a vector of piecewise-constant inputs held for periods ∆.
The stage cost Le(x, u) is optimized (Eq. (2a)) subject to
the nominal (w ≡ 0) dynamic model of Eq. (2b), the state
measurement of Eq. (2c), the state constraint of Eq. (2d), and
the input constraint of Eq. (2e).
On the Role of Design in Preventing Cyberattack Success
In this section, we demonstrate conceptually that the suc-
cess of cyberattacks on process control systems cannot be
fully prevented at the control design level, but that process
design, as well as equipment design and selection, have the
potential to prevent certain attack types which could jeopar-
dize alternative designs from succeeding. We utilize a nu-
merical example and a process example involving two con-
tinuous stirred tank reactors (CSTR’s) and a separator to aid
in clarifying and drawing several conclusions with respect to
the role of design in preventing the success of cyberattacks
on process control systems. Throughout this work, we con-
sider cyberattack-resilience to mean that no safety issues oc-
cur during a cyberattack (i.e., x(t) ∈ X , t ≥ 0, even under a
cyberattack).
The Inadequacy of Control Laws for Preventing Safety Issues
Arising from Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks may target a variety of communication
channels within feedback control loops, including the com-
munication between the sensors and controller, and also be-
tween the controller and the actuators. Attacks of the lat-
ter type bypass controllers in a feedback loop completely
and therefore cannot be stopped by adjusting the control sys-
tem design. In Durand [2018], we explored several different
MPC designs with respect to whether they are resilient to
cyberattacks in which false state measurement information
was provided to the MPC’s at each sampling time. A case in
which cyberattack-resilience of a control system against sen-
sor measurement falsification is achieved is in the case that
the operating steady-state is open-loop stable, such that the
open-loop stable input (which is independent of feedback and
therefore independent of the process sensors) can be utilized
to drive the closed-loop state to the steady-state regardless of
whether an attacker can modify the sensor readings or not.
The fact that the success of this approach relies on a lack of
feedback indicates that it is difficult to conceive of control
designs which utilize feedback but do not produce problem-
atic inputs when state measurements are falsified. Another
concept that has been explored for utilizing controllers in
preventing cyberattacks from being successful has involved
controller or instrumentation reconfiguration after an attack
is detected. A difficulty with this approach is that detection
of the attack, a pre-requisite to switching to a control strategy
which maintains safe operation during the attack, requires
some expectation of what the attacks will target, so that met-
rics related to the expected target can be monitored. Given
the complexity of large-scale chemical plants and interac-
tions between units, determining all of the types of attack
targets may be difficult. In conclusion, there are many meth-
ods for evading control-focused efforts for preventing safety
issues due to cyberattacks.
The Roles of Process Design and Equipment Design in Pre-
venting Safety Issues Arising from Cyberattacks
Despite that control designs are not expected to be capa-
ble of preventing safety incidents in various cyberattack sce-
narios, appropriate process designs and equipment designs
may aid in preventing the success of cyberattacks. At this
point, it is not clear how conservative designs may need to be
to prevent the success of cyberattacks. In this work, however,
we do not focus on design conservatism, but rather on eluci-
dating the manner in which process and equipment designs
relate to the success or failure of cyberattacks.
To demonstrate that process designs can play a key role
in preventing the success of cyberattacks, consider a vessel
in which a runaway reaction could occur (e.g., Zhang et al.
[2018]), causing the pressure in the vessel to build up such
that an explosion takes place if sufficient cooling is not pro-
vided. One could imagine that if the coolant flow rate were a
manipulated input, a cyberattacker might seek to gain control
of this input and then set it artificially low so that the appro-
priate cooling is not provided as the reaction takes place. If
this were to result in an increase in pressure in the vessel, but
the vessel were instrumented with a safety relief valve, the
attack may not be able to create an explosion.
With regard to equipment design/selection, the majority
of attacks intended to impact process safety which can be
conceived are intended to impact process equipment fidelity,
including the situation in the above paragraph in which a run-
away reaction is initiated with the intent of compromising the
reactor vessel. A successful cyberattack on the control sys-
tem in a uranium enrichment plant in Iran via the Stuxnet
worm was also geared toward compromising equipment (it
spun centrifuges at the plant at speeds that damaged them Fi-
dler [2011]). One of the challenges with respect to ana-
lyzing equipment fidelity for chemical processes under at-
tacks is that there are many mechanisms of failure of equip-
ment Dowling [2013], and equipment is typically designed to
withstand expected loading during operation. Cyberattacks
may create unexpected loading for which the equipment was
not designed; however, determining all of the types of unex-
pected loading to which equipment might be subjected via
rogue control actions can be challenging.
In the following sections, we present a numerical exam-
ple that illustrates the concept of designing equipment to be
cyberattack-resilient. Subsequently, we analyze a chemical
process example that suggests initial steps for characteriz-
ing whether a process/equipment design inhibits cyberattack
success or not.
Cybersecurity and Process Equipment Design: A Numerical
Example
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illus-
trate the concept that equipment designs might be selected
to prevent certain cyberattacks from being successful. The
example is based on a case study from Durand [in press] in
which a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is followed
by a section of process piping that is rigidly fixed on the end
that is closest to the CSTR outlet and has a bellows joint on
the opposite end, with spring constant ks. The following dy-
namic model describes the manner in which the concentra-
tion of the reactant A (which is converted to B in the CSTR)
and temperature T in the reactor change over time as the val-
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where F , V , k0, E, Rg , ∆H , ρL, and Cp represent, respec-
tively, the flow rate into and out of the CSTR, the CSTR vol-
ume, the pre-exponential constant, the activation energy of
the reaction, the ideal gas constant, the enthalpy of reaction,
the liquid density, and the heat capacity of the liquid in the
CSTR. The values of the parameters can be found in Durand
[in press].
The piping element has a yield strength of 270 MPa,
a thermal expansion coefficient of 12.5 × 10−6 K−1, a
Young’s Modulus of 200 GPa, and a cross-sectional area
A = 0.002041 m2 Barron and Barron [2012]. A safety factor
of 2.7 is used in setting the design stress (which is set to 108
Pa and is the value of the stress which it is desired that the
stress in the pipe not exceed). Consider that the initial ma-
terials selection for the CSTR allows the CSTR to withstand
temperatures up to 400 K above the operating steady-state
temperature, but that the initial design for the piping uses an
unusually stiff bellows joint with ks = 5.5× 107 N/m. With
this bellows joint, the stress in the piping element will ex-
ceed the design stress if the temperature of the piping exceeds
about 11.8 K above the steady-state value Ts of the temper-
ature of the CSTR outlet. We consider that the piping is in-
sulated such that it could reach these high temperatures if the
temperature of the fluid exiting the CSTR exceeds Ts by 11.8
































Figure 1. States over one hour of operation for the process
of Eqs. (3)-(4) under EMPC with a sensor attack.
K and remains at that temperature long enough for the pipe
temperature to also exceed 11.8 K above Ts. Furthermore,
it will yield (exceeding the yield strength will be considered
undesirable for the part in this example) if the temperature of
the pipe wall exceeds Ts by about 278 K. The controller for
the CSTR is an MPC which promotes steady-state operation
with bounds on CA0 between 0.5 and 7.5 kmol/m3 and on
Q between −5 × 105 and 5 × 105 kJ/h, with a stage cost as
follows:
Le =100(CA − CAs)2 + (T − Ts)2
+ (CA0 − CA0s)2 + 10−10(Q−Qs)2
(5)
The controller parameters are N = 10 and ∆ = 0.01 h. The
optimization problem of the MPC was solved using MAT-
LAB’s function fmincon. The process of Eqs. (3)-(4) is sim-
ulated under this controller with an integration step of 10−4
h, and in the absence of an attack, the closed-loop state
is driven to the steady-state with CA = CAs, T = Ts,
CA0 = CA0s, and Q = Qs from an initial condition at
CA − CAs = −0.4 kmol/m3 and T − Ts = 8 K. If an at-
tack is performed that provides, for example, the same false
state measurement at every sampling time for 100 sampling
times of CA(tk) = 0.05 kmol/m3 and T (tk) = 440 K, then
the trajectory in Fig. 1 is obtained. In this case, the temper-
ature of the fluid leaving the CSTR exceeds its steady-state
value by 320 K. If the piping element comes to equilibrium
with the fluid temperature at this condition, then the stress
in the pipe will be beyond that required to cause yielding.
This occurs even though the material from which the CSTR
itself is made is able to withstand the high temperature in the
CSTR.
If the fact that the piping could be compromised by the
proposed cyberattack was discovered before construction of
the equipment through numerical simulations, one technique
for preventing the cyberattack described from causing fail-
ure of the piping would be to select a less stiff bellows
joint. For example, if the bellows joint was selected to have
ks = 4.4×105 N/m (noted by Barron and Barron [2012] to be
a more typical value of spring bellows constants), the temper-
ature of the pipe would need to be about 39,410 K above Ts,
a case which would never be expected in practice, before the
yield strength would be reached. With that spring constant, if
an attack is performed on the MPC in which CA(tk) = 0.05
kmol/m3 and T (tk) = 440 K at every sampling period, then
neither the maximum temperature allowable in the CSTR or
in the piping is exceeded in the one hour of operation accord-
ing to Fig. 1. As a steady-state temperature (different from
Ts) appears to have been reached by the end of one hour
of operation in Fig. 1, one could conclude that the equip-
ment design is now resilient against the specific cyberattack
in which CA(tk) = 0.05 kmol/m3 and T (tk) = 440 K at
every sampling time.
To determine whether this new equipment design is
cyberattack-resilient against any cyberattacks which could be
performed, one could begin testing various types of attacks to
see whether any of them appears to be capable of compromis-
ing the equipment. For example, if instead an attack is per-
formed in which T (tk) = 430 K, then the temperature at the
CSTR outlet becomes 547 K above its steady-state value after
1 h of operation. This temperature is now lower than the tem-
perature at which the piping element would exceed the yield
strength, but is now higher than the temperature which could
cause failure of the CSTR. Though one could again modify
the equipment design to prevent failure of the CSTR in this
attack scenario (perhaps modifying the material from which
the CSTR is constructed), the process of trying an attack, as-
sessing the outcome, and modifying equipment accordingly
is not straightforward. It lacks a systematic methodology for
generating attack scenarios to be used in testing the equip-
ment fidelity. It may be difficult to postulate every possible
attack and how it may impact equipment, as attacks may be
of various types (e.g., they may not only be those in which
the sensor measurement is fixed at every sampling time, but
may change between sampling times and operate a process
in a dynamic fashion). This means that even material fail-
ure mechanisms which are related to dynamic behavior (e.g.,
fatigue) may also need to be considered.
This example has been numerically constructed (with
some liberty taken in selecting equipment designs and allow-
able maximum temperatures in the equipment that would not
be expected to be appropriate in practice) to illustrate the con-
cept that equipment designs can play a role in the success of
cyberattacks, and that clever equipment designs may prevent
some attacks that would otherwise compromise equipment
from being able to do so. It also clarifies that: 1) determining
how attacks might impact equipment may be difficult given
the many different failure mechanisms of materials and the
many different types of attacks which could be performed
to make the various failure mechanisms relevant and 2) at a
large-scale plant with connected units and coupled process
dynamics, attacks might be deployed which modify inputs to
one unit to seek to cause failure in another that is, perhaps,
downstream (this is shown in the case of the first attack ex-
amine above, where when ks = 5.5× 107 N/m, the changes
in the manipulated inputs which directly impact the states of
the process fluid in the CSTR are utilized not to cause failure
of the CSTR, but to impact the downstream piping). The fact
that some level of analysis of the ability of the equipment to
withstand cyberattacks is demonstrated to be achievable in
this example suggests that that the potential of equipment or
process designs to withstand cyberattacks may be a worth-
while consideration during process hazard analysis.
Cyberattacks and Process Design: A Chemical Process Ex-
ample
In the process example in this section, we move from in-
vestigating the impacts of equipment design on cybersecurity
to investigating the impacts of process design. To do so, we
consider the process example from Lao et al. [2013] in which
two CSTR’s in series are followed by a flash drum. CSTR’s
1 and 2 (Vessels 1 and 2, respectively) receive fresh feed of
the reactant A at concentrations CA10 and CA20 at flow rates
F10 and F20, respectively. The first CSTR also receives a
recycle stream of condensed vapor from the overhead of the
flash drum (Vessel 3) at flow rate Fr. The product stream
F3 is the liquid condensed in the flash drum. Heat is sup-
plied or removed from CSTR 1, CSTR 2, and the flash drum
at rates Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively. The model equations
and parameters are those in Lao et al. [2013], with a slight
change to the equations representing the concentrations CAr,
CBr, and CCr of species A, B, and C in the recycle stream
(where B is the desired product produced from A, and C is




, j = A,B,C,D (6)
where D is an inert material, αj is the relative volatility of
species j at the conditions in the flash drum, and Cji, i =
1, 2, 3, is the concentration of species j in the liquid in Vessel






















where ρ is the density of the liquid in the flash drum, ρM is
the molar density (assumed for ease of modeling to be the
same for the liquid and vapor) in the flash drum, and MWj is
the molecular weight of species j. Two steady-states of the
process will be of interest in the studies below for the state
vector x̄= [T1 CA1 CB1 CC1 T2 CA2 CB2 CC2 T3 CA3 CB3
CC3]
T , where Ti is the temperature in Vessel i: an open-loop
unstable steady-state x̄u = [370.22 3.29 0.17 0.042 435.32
2.74 0.45 0.11 435.15 2.88 0.50 0.12]T and an open-loop
stable steady-state x̄s = [300.97 3.55 0.0035 0.00050 300.78
3.32 0.0029 0.00041 300.61 3.50 0.0033 0.00044]T (stabil-
ity or instability was assumed from open-loop simulations).
The steady-state values of the process manipulated inputs
Q1, Q2, Q3, and ∆F20 = (F20 − 5) m3/h are zero. The
CSTR is operated under an MPC where the lower and upper
bounds on each heat rate input are −1×106 and 1×106 kJ/h,
respectively, and the upper and lower bounds on ∆F20 are -5
and 5 m3/h. The stage cost is
Le = 10
5((x̄− x̄q)P (x̄− x̄q)T + 5× 10−12Q21
+ 5× 10−12Q22 + 5× 10−12Q23 + 100∆F 220)
(9)
where q is either u or s, depending on
whether the process is to be operated around
the stable or unstable steady-state, and P =
diag(20, 103, 103, 103, 10, 103, 103, 103, 10, 103, 103, 103).
The process model is integrated with an integration step
size of 10−5 h. It is operated for one hour with N = 6 and
∆ = 0.005 h. The MATLAB function fmincon is utilized in
solving the optimization problem.
We now analyze how two attacks on this process play
out differently to gain insights into how design impacts cy-
bersecurity. Fig. 2 shows the results when an MPC which
incorporates a model of the three-unit process in Eq. (2b)
and has q = u in Eq. (9) is used to control the process
with recycle when it is initialized from xI = x̄q + [10 0.5
−0.001 −0.0001 −10 0.5 −0.001 −0.0001 10 0.5 −0.001
−0.0001]T with q = u, but the false state measurement
xF1 provided at every sampling time is x̄u. By providing
the MPC with a state measurement corresponding to the op-
erating steady-state, the MPC is tricked into computing the
steady-state control action, as this is the control action that
we would like it to compute if, in reality, the process state
is at the steady-state. Because the steady-state at which we
would like to stabilize the closed-loop state is open-loop un-
stable, when the inputs are fixed at the steady-state values by
the MPC but the process state is not at x̄u, the closed-loop
state does not approach x̄u but instead approaches a differ-
ent (stable) steady-state with problematically high tempera-
tures in the various units. The steady-state input provided
by the MPC is thus insufficient for driving the closed-loop
state back to x̄u during the attack. An important point about
this attack is that despite the fact that the system dynamics
in this case are more complex than those in, for example,
Eqs. (3)-(4), due to the multiple interconnected units and re-
cycle, applying the steady-state input corresponding to an
open-loop unstable steady-state when the closed-loop state
is not initialized at that steady-state is an easy-to-recognize
attack strategy. It is also easy to figure out how to achieve
with the control design at hand, because it is well-known that
an MPC designed to track a steady-state will compute the
steady-state input if the state measurement is at the steady-
state. This implies: 1) there may be some attacks which can
be readily identified during certain hazard assessments if cri-
teria for recognizing these attacks (e.g., false state measure-
ments which lead to open-loop unstable steady-state control
inputs being applied to a process when it is off the steady-
state) are developed, and then the process can be protected
against such attacks via strategies in process/equipment de-
sign or detection/controller reconfiguration and 2) the fact
that the process dynamics are coupled, large-scale, or com-
plex does not necessarily mean that it is difficult for an at-
tacker to locate a method for successfully bringing the plant
to an unsafe condition.
Now consider that this same process is operated around


































Figure 2. T1, T2, and T3 over 1 h of operation for the 2
CSTR-flash drum process under a cyberattacked EMPC pro-
vided the false state measurement xF1.
the stable steady-state (i.e., q = s in the above problem for-
mulation). In this case, the same type of cyberattack (i.e., x̄s
is the falsified input at every sampling time) does not suc-
ceed in causing a safety concern, because it causes the MPC
to compute open-loop stable inputs that drive the closed-loop
state to the open-loop stable steady-state. From a nonlinear
systems perspective, if there are multiple steady-states (as in
this example) for a given set of inputs, the set of initial states
around x̄s from which the steady-state input might be applied
and the closed-loop state would be driven to the origin is not
Rn. This suggests a (computationally-laborious) mechanism
for anticipating some of the conditions which might be set up
under a cyberattack on the process state measurements that
maintains these falsified sensor values constant throughout
the time of the attack. Specifically, for MPC, a characteristic
of attacks that present the same falsified state measurement at
every sampling time is that the MPC will compute the same
input at every sampling time. To analyze whether there exist
significant concerns with respect to a process and/or equip-
ment design being susceptible to a cyberattack, a technique
that could be attempted would be to discretize the input space
between the input bounds as well as the state space and then
determine, for each point in the state-space, all steady-states
which can be found to be associated with each input combi-
nation in the input space. Subsequently, the worst-case sce-
narios revealed by this analysis could be analyzed to deter-
mine whether they indicate that problematic conditions are
likely to occur or not, and if so, how equipment or process
design might be adjusted to modify that. Despite the fact
that this technique does not explore dynamic behavior which
may be set up by cyberattacks and that it is likely to be com-
putationally intractable with full process models, it suggests
the beginnings of a systematic approach to characterizing
whether a process is cyberattack-resilient.
The analysis with respect to the two cyberattacks on the
CSTR-CSTR-flash drum process as detailed above also pro-
vides insight into how cyberattacks should and should not be
understood. For example, the heat inputs applied at every
sampling time in Fig. 2 are zero, and yet the temperatures in
every vessel increased significantly because the initial condi-
tion was one in which the reactant A was present in the two
CSTR’s and converted to the products with no heat removed
from the vessel as the exothermic reactions took place. The
reason that that cyberattack succeeds is a combination of the
initial condition and how the inputs applied from the process
condition drive it to an unsafe operating condition by taking
advantage of the physics of the process. The manner in which
attacks succeed is not the result only of the inputs which the
attacker applies (e.g., it is not necessarily true that Q1 must
become large for T1 to become large), but of the direction in
which these inputs drive the process given the process state
when the actions begin to be applied. As noted in Durand
[2018], the results of attacks may be difficult to predict in
many cases, as the results would be state trajectories for cou-
pled nonlinear systems under various input trajectories.
An important question which remains to be addressed for
the example above is how the design might be modified in
light of the realization that a cyberattack could be easily per-
formed on the system. Part of the reason why the cyberattack
can be easily performed is that the desired operating condi-
tions correspond to an unstable steady-state for the system.
The steady-state is unstable due to the process dynamics. An
interesting future research direction could be exploring tech-
niques for modifying designs while maintaining the operat-
ing steady-state as a process steady-state (but perhaps mod-
ifying its stability). One could also consider adding safety
systems Ahooyi et al. [2016] which are physically activated
when the conditions of the process reach certain values, be-
fore an unsafe but stable steady-state is reached, essentially
using a strategy which switches the process dynamics au-
tomatically when the inputs are not as expected, in an at-
tempt to cause the modified dynamics to prevent the safety is-
sues. Selecting equipment that results in tighter input bounds
might also be an option. It would be expected that equipment
with more significant limitations (i.e., smaller ranges of al-
lowable inputs) would prevent the worst-case scenarios from
deviating too much from the steady-state conditions. How-
ever, small ranges for the allowable inputs may negatively
impact the ability of the control system to be flexible and to
reject disturbances. In summary, techniques are needed for
considering designs and changes in designs within a dynamic
systems framework.
Conclusions
This work presented preliminary results in the direction
of seeking to understand the extent to which cybersecurity
of process control systems might be understood as a pro-
cess and equipment design problem. The task of design-
ing cyberattack-resilient systems for the process industries is
challenging, and the solution is not likely to come from con-
trol design. It remains to be seen whether process and equip-
ment design may provide a solution in many cases or if, like
inherent safety Kletz and Amyotte [2010], it may be deemed
a consideration for design rather than a condition of design if
it requires significant conservatism that reduces the economic
attractiveness of processes. Motivated by the fact that cyber-
attacks introduce transients even into processes which might
otherwise be operated at steady-state, an interesting future
direction could be to explore whether there may exist novel
process and equipment designs that are not necessarily de-
veloped for a steady-state paradigm and which may allow for
greater economic benefits with cyberattack-resilience beyond
what can be achieved in traditional paradigms. It may also
be interesting to consider the extent to which design-based
cyberattack-resilience considerations might be extended to
make processes resilient (from a process safety perspective)
to actuator and sensor faults, as the techniques for developing
resilience that have been described above are independent of
sensor measurements and are related only to whether the ac-
tuator outputs are within their bounds, and not to the exact
value that they take within their bounds.
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